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FSMA Surveillance Working Group 2013 Report to HHS Secretary 
SUMMARY 
In 2011, the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) authorized the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) to create a diverse working group of experts and stakeholders to provide routine and ongoing guidance to 
improve foodborne illness surveillance systems in the United States. This second annual report summarizes the 
FSMA Surveillance Working Group’s (FSMA SWG) activities and recommendations during fiscal year (FY) 2013.  
The FSMA SWG held two, 2-day meetings at CDC in FY 2013, convening in December 2012 and again in May 
2013 to review and provide feedback on surveillance projects and guidance on 1) responding effectively to the 
public health challenges resulting from the increasing use of culture-independent diagnostic tests (CIDTs); 2) 
utilizing meaningful performance measures for foodborne illness surveillance; and 3) advancing several CDC 
FSMA-related projects to enhance foodborne disease surveillance.  
The issue of CIDTs was identified as a critically important area that will soon require national attention. Although 
the increasing use of non-culture, rapid diagnostic tests in the clinical setting offers many advantages, this shift 
also presents significant challenges to current laboratory-based public health surveillance systems that rely on 
culture.  As the use of CIDTs becomes widespread, there will be a dramatic reduction in the number of isolates 
(i.e., live bacterial samples) available for pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)––the DNA fingerprinting 
technique used by PulseNet and other large foodborne disease surveillance systems to detect foodborne 
outbreaks resulting from widely distributed contaminated foods.  The effect of this decrease in isolates extends 
beyond foodborne disease surveillance and will require broad changes to many large, culture-based disease-
monitoring systems in the near future.  The Working Group strongly recommends that, under CDC leadership, a 
comprehensive strategy be developed for designing and implementing a culture-independent typing system that 
meets public health needs while preserving the current capabilities in the interim.  This strategy should include the 
short-term maintenance of culture-based testing and current PulseNet capacity until longer-term solutions to meet 
public health needs using next-generation molecular diagnostic technologies and associated bioinformatics 
capacity are identified, standardized, and implemented.  Implementation of such a comprehensive strategy will 
require adequate resources. 
The FSMA SWG strongly endorsed the use of meaningful foodborne illness surveillance performance measures 
at the local, state, and federal levels to show progress in reducing foodborne illness, to identify the best evidence-
based public health practices, and to encourage programmatic accountability.  In addition, the Working Group 
emphasized the importance of metrics to quantify the impact of foodborne surveillance programs, policies, and 
regulatory changes and to track progress and improvements in food safety. However, consensus is needed to 
determine the most effective performance measures to utilize as well as the methods for evaluating them, since 
there are more measures than most state and local jurisdictions have the capacity to implement.     
In the course of its work, the Working Group repeatedly noted the importance of national and state/local 
surveillance for foodborne illness and emphasized that the data gathered from this surveillance are critical to 
detect outbreaks and identify new vehicles for foodborne illness; to monitor the safety of the food supply; and to 
direct risk-based food safety efforts by CDC, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA).  Further, the Working Group noted the recent loss of capacity at state and local levels due 
to broad budget cuts and underscored the need for additional resources to build on and better integrate existing 
surveillance systems and fill existing and emerging data gaps.  Finally, the Working Group repeatedly noted  that 
foodborne illness surveillance and outbreak investigations to determine root causes lead to better hazard analysis 
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and more targeted food safety controls at food production, processing and distribution levels.  The absence of this 
information undermines the effectiveness of preventive control programs mandated by FSMA for the food 
industry.   
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Each year, an estimated 
48 million people (1 in 6 
Americans) get sick, 
128,000 are hospitalized, 
and 3,000 die from 
(largely) preventable 
foodborne diseases.1 
FSMA Surveillance Working Group 2013 Report to HHS Secretary 
INTRODUCTION 
Public health surveillance is necessary for improving food safety. Timely 
detection and control of foodborne disease cases and outbreaks can directly 
reduce their public health impact, identify new food safety hazards, and enable 
investigators, regulators, and the food industry to learn more about ways to 
prevent these diseases.  
Foodborne illnesses and outbreaks are reported and investigated at the local 
and state levels.  These investigations help identify and prevent foodborne 
illness at the local/state jurisdictions and provide essential information for 
national public health and food safety systems.  CDC compiles information from 
local and state agencies and works with them to identify and link outbreak-associated illnesses, leading to 
identification of contaminated foods and management and control of outbreaks. Outbreak data are collected, 
analyzed, and shared with many stakeholders. For example, CDC’s 2011 Estimates of Foodborne Illness1,2 
(http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodborne-estimates.html) serve as a foundation (or springboard) for 
action by CDC, regulatory agencies, the food-producing industry, and others interested in improving food safety. 
Foodborne disease and outbreak surveillance data aggregated by CDC are essential for many functions, 
including informing evidence-based policy, providing assessments of public health risk, and developing prevention 
messages for food safety improvements.  These data are relied upon by other government regulatory agencies 
and analyzed by media, public health, and consumer organizations that provide food safety advice to consumers 
and policy makers. In January 2013, CDC released the first comprehensive set of estimates of the food 
categories responsible for foodborne illnesses acquired in the United States from 1998-2008 
(http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/attribution-1998-2008.html).3   Building on the 2011 estimates, which 
showed that about 48 million people (1 in 6) get sick each year from food, these new estimates help regulators 
and industry identify the groups of foods most responsible for foodborne illness.  These data also provide a 
historical baseline of estimates that can be further refined over time as more data and improved methods become 
available.   
Over the years, differences in data collection and reporting among states, along with issues regarding integration 
among various government agencies, have led to calls for improvements to ensure that foodborne illness 
surveillance systems are providing the necessary data to assist government agencies, industry, and other food 
safety stakeholders in their risk-management activities (http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety/outbreak_report.html, 
http://cspinet.org/foodsafety/riskymeat.html).  
CDC and the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) 
The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) provided FDA with new 
enforcement authority designed to achieve higher rates of compliance with prevention and risk-based food safety 
standards to better prevent contamination events as well as respond to and contain problems when they occur.  
Additionally, the law directed FDA to build an integrated national food safety system in partnership with state and 
local authorities. Recognizing the critical role of foodborne illness surveillance data in informing prevention efforts 
and CDC’s expertise in this area, FSMA also directed CDC to improve governmental coordination and integration, 
evaluate and improve foodborne illness surveillance systems, and enhance external stakeholder collaboration.  
On January 4, 2011, FSMA authorized CDC to create a diverse working group of experts and stakeholders to 
provide routine and ongoing guidance to improve foodborne illness surveillance systems in the United States and 
to provide advice on the criteria for the designation of five Integrated Food Safety Centers of Excellence (CoEs).   
In response, the FSMA Surveillance Working Group (FSMA-SWG) of the Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC), 
Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), CDC, was created, with BSC/OID member Dr. James Hadler of Yale 
University’s School of Public Health serving as Chair. FSMA-SWG membership comprises 21 experts 
representing local, state, and federal governments, academia, industry, and consumer groups (Appendix 1).   
According to FSMA legislation regarding improvement of foodborne illness surveillance systems, areas for 
working group discussion and provision of guidance are 
“(A) the priority needs of regulatory agencies, the food industry, and consumers for information and analysis 
on foodborne illness and its causes; 
(B) opportunities to improve the effectiveness of initiatives at the Federal, State, and local levels, including 
coordination and integration of activities among Federal agencies, and between the Federal, State, and local 
levels of government; 
(C) improvement in the timeliness and depth of access by regulatory and health agencies, the food industry, 
academic researchers, and consumers to foodborne illness aggregated, de-identified surveillance data 
collected by government agencies at all levels, including data compiled by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention; 
(D) key barriers at Federal, State, and local levels to improving foodborne illness surveillance and the utility of 
such surveillance for preventing foodborne illness; 
(E) the capabilities needed for establishing automatic electronic searches of surveillance data; and 
(F) specific actions to reduce barriers to improvement, implement the Working Group’s recommendations, 
and achieve the purposes of this section, with measurable objectives and timelines, and identification of 
resource and staffing needs.” 
This annual report, which FSMA requires, highlights the FSMA-SWG’s activities and recommendations for FY 
2013 and summarizes priority areas for focus in the coming year. 
WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES – FY 2013 
In FY 2013, the FSMA SWG met twice at CDC to consider several recent and ongoing developments in 
foodborne illness surveillance that will be key to maintaining and improving surveillance systems.  For FY 2013, 
the Working Group reviewed the topics of culture independent diagnostic tests (CIDTs) and utilization of 
performance measures, and provided guidance in each of these areas.  The Working Group also reviewed, 
discussed, and provided guidance on several other CDC FSMA-related projects to enhance foodborne 
surveillance.  For reference, a summary of selected CDC activities conducted in FY 2013 to address FSMA is 
included in Appendix 2. 
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Culture-independent diagnostic tests (CIDTs) 
Introduction 
Public health surveillance of foodborne infectious diseases is a critical component of a risk-based, prevention-
focused public health system.  Information gathered through surveillance (including both epidemiologic and 
laboratory components) is used to detect outbreaks; quantify the impact of foodborne disease; develop attribution 
models; inform risk assessments; set public health priorities; monitor trends in foodborne illnesses, outbreaks, 
and antibiotic resistance of foodborne pathogens; evaluate the effectiveness of prevention strategies; and identify 
rare and emerging issues that may have otherwise gone unnoticed.   
Significant advances in foodborne disease surveillance in the last 20 years—most notable, the establishment of 
standardized, integrated molecular surveillance efforts via the laboratory-based system PulseNet—have 
transformed public health and made foodborne outbreaks both detectable and visible.  In particular, molecular 
surveillance of foodborne disease-causing bacteria has allowed us to “connect the dots” and to identify linked 
outbreaks as well as new food vehicles and to follow the evolution of virulence factors and antimicrobial 
susceptibility.  Despite these achievements, the full potential of molecular surveillance remains untapped.  
Untrained health providers, a fragmented food safety system, and inadequate funding and staff, particularly at the 
state and local levels, have led to incomplete participation in surveillance systems, persistent backlogs of data, 
and lack of data sharing.  Increasing the number of laboratory-confirmed cases of foodborne disease would 
increase the impact of epidemiologic studies and the likelihood of finding the source of foodborne outbreaks.4 
Recent advances in rapid clinical diagnostics for enteric pathogens are expected to increase the proportion of 
foodborne disease cases diagnosed and reported to public health officials and also reduce time lags.5   
Traditionally, laboratories have relied on testing isolates from cultures of foodborne pathogens.  However, new 
laboratory tests that are culture-independent are increasingly being used.  These tests can be performed in large 
batches, are potentially less expensive and can more quickly provide results for patient management. However, 
their use also affects the capacity of public health surveillance systems that rely on isolates from culture.  
Because fewer isolates are available for public health use, the ability of current molecular laboratory surveillance 
platforms to link foodborne disease cases from different localities will be reduced. To maintain this capacity and 
address future challenges, public health must develop new technologies for tracking foodborne pathogens, 
undertake strategic planning projects to develop next-generation diagnostic platforms that meet public health 
needs, and make investments in public health surveillance infrastructure.  The benefits and challenges identified 
and discussed by the Working Group regarding CIDTs are presented below. 
Benefits and Challenges 
Currently, most national and multistate outbreaks of foodborne disease are detected by PulseNet, whose member 
laboratories use pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) to subtype isolates obtained through culture by clinical 
laboratories. PFGE requires bacterial isolates, and, at present, so does bacterial gene sequencing, a more 
precise means to test similarities/differences in bacterial pathogens. 
The development and increasing use of CIDTs for bacterial enteric pathogens directly impacts the public health 
surveillance system (Table 1).  CIDTs provide the benefit of being faster and potentially less expensive which 
should enable more cases of foodborne illness to be diagnosed and reported.  A further benefit is many of these 
rapid tests are designed to look for multiple pathogens that are currently missed with culture-based technology.  
The central challenge for these new tests is they do not produce the cultures and pure isolates currently needed 
by public health surveillance systems to detect outbreaks and monitor trends in disease and antibiotic resistance. 
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Table 1. Benefits and Challenges of Increased Use of CIDTs 
Perspective Benefits Challenges 
Patient  • Rapid diagnosis 
• Improved sensitivity for some pathogens 
• Multiple agents tested for at once 
• Improved clinical decision making 
• Fewer undiagnosed cases 
• Fewer patients treated unnecessarily 
• Lower costs 
• Less specificity and, possibly, sensitivity 
• May not be clear which pathogen is 
causing disease 
• False positives may result in incorrect 
diagnosis and unnecessary treatment  
• Potential short-term loss of antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing 
Population • Rapid detection of cases 
• Increased case ascertainment due to 
increased testing 
• Increased sensitivity for some pathogens 
• Increased ability to distinguish strains of 
each pathogen and to detect more 
outbreaks 
• Loss of subtyping ability; antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing 
• False positives may lead to unnecessary 
case follow-up and investigation of 
pseudo-outbreaks 
• Potential short-term decreased ability to 
detect widespread, dispersed outbreaks 
• Disrupted/decreased ability to monitor 
trends; estimate illnesses 
• Need to develop new case definitions 
accounting for a variety of rapid methods 
Adapted from Cronquist et al,5 and Atkinson et al.7  
As clinical laboratories switch to CIDTs, public health laboratories will likely be forced to assume the task of 
culturing specimens and obtaining pure isolates.6   However, the public health laboratory system is not designed 
for large numbers of primary cultures and lacks the resources to absorb the increased workload.7   As a result, 
fewer microbial DNA fingerprints will be uploaded to PulseNet and the time from initial diagnostic test to an isolate 
being available for PFGE will be lengthened.   
Until PulseNet incorporates newer technology, the reduced availability of isolates will cause a decrease in the 
capacity of public health to detect and solve large and important outbreaks, track trends in the incidence of 
foodborne illness, and monitor antibiotic resistance.  In addition, industry and regulators will not have the 
information they need to identify gaps in food safety, which will likely lead to an increase in cases of foodborne 
illness.  The decrease in (or loss of) culture-based testing will also have a negative impact on food safety systems 
beyond PulseNet, affecting several components of the national foodborne illness monitoring platforms, including 
the Foodborne Diseases Centers for Outbreak Response enhancement (FoodCORE), OutbreakNet, the National 
Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS), the FDA Coordinated Outbreak Response & Evaluation 
(CORE) Network, and the Predictive Analytics component of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food 
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), Public Health Information System (PHIS).  Unfortunately, although the 
promise of new technology is great, there is currently no technology that can replace culture for the detection of 
clusters of foodborne illness based on the characteristics of the pathogen.   
Examples of Potential Action 
The Working Group reviewed work done by other groups examining the CIDT challenge and identified several 
potential solutions that could address the immediate threat to culture-based surveillance systems resulting from 
widespread adoption of CIDTs.  These solutions could maintain or even enhance the current capacity of these 
systems to detect and investigate outbreaks until newer technologies are developed and incorporated (Table 2).    
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Table 2. Potential Actions for Improving Public Health Surveillance of Foodborne Diseases*  
Area Potential Actions 




 In collaboration with key stakeholders, conduct timely, real world validation 
studies of new testing methods to define performance characteristics 





 Develop best practice documents and clinical guidelines for laboratories to follow 
and disseminate widely 
 Conduct provider/health system surveys to determine populations for which 
CIDTS are being used 




 Recommend reflex culture of positive specimens at clinical laboratories. 
 Request forwarding of clinical material to state public health laboratories for 
culture 
 Assess need to change specimen submission requirements and determine 
specifics for submitting clinical material to state public health laboratories for 
culture 
 Establish sentinel site surveillance to ensure isolate submission for 
characterization of specific attributes of pathogens. 
Adapt 
Surveillance 
 Modify case definitions used by public health to include cases identified by CIDTs 
and consider pilot implementation in geographically limited systems (e.g., 
FoodNet) 
 Collect data on cases not meeting confirmed case definitions and modify data 
systems to capture more detailed laboratory data for cases 
 Enhance the quality and quantity of exposure information by improving exposure 
assessments and reporting tools (e.g., as soon as a diagnosis is made, patients 
should be systematically interviewed to identify potential sources of exposure)  
 Improve information flow and data sharing between databases. 
Provide 
Resources 
 Provide resources to public health laboratories to confirm CIDT findings and 
generate isolates for PulseNet, NARMS, etc. 
 Expand state and local capacity for foodborne illness response by increasing 
extramural food safety funding provided through CDC’s Epidemiology and 
Laboratory Capacity for Infectious Diseases Cooperative Agreement (ELC) 
 Invest in infrastructure and research 
 Advocate for adequate public health funding for surveillance 
*Adapted from the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL; www.aphl.org/) white paper;8 the Center for 
Foodborne Illness Research & Prevention (CFI; http://www.foodborneillness.org/) white paper;9 and Cronquist et 
al.5 
Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages, but none are potential long-term solutions.  Cost 
and practicality are major issues for each potential solution.  However, the benefits of implementing these stop-
gap measures will clearly outweigh the costs.  Loss of capacity in systems such as PulseNet would affect our 
ability to continually and consistently detect and investigate foodborne illness. Information gained from these 
investigations significantly benefits public health by improving our understanding of the epidemiology of foodborne 
disease as well as our ability to detect and control outbreaks and monitor antimicrobial resistance.  This 
information directly impacts the public by ensuring that contaminated food is removed from further sale before 
5 
 
additional people become sick and also drives improvements in food safety in both the regulatory and industry 
arenas.  Several federal projects  have identified critical needs and priorities for improving foodborne disease 
surveillance. For example, CDC has identified food safety as an Agency Winnable Battle 
(http://www.cdc.gov/winnablebattles/) and cited two areas in which action would have a significant impact on 
public health: 1) improving knowledge of the incidence, trends, burden, and causes of foodborne disease 
outbreaks; and 2) improving capacity to detect and respond quickly to foodborne disease outbreaks. Similarly, 
CDC’s Infectious Disease Framework (http://www.cdc.gov/oid/framework.html)10 identifies critical elements, 
priorities, and key activities to guide public health actions to improve public health infrastructure around foodborne 
disease, including addressing the potential impact of CIDTs on disease surveillance.  Under FSMA, CDC is 
mandated to coordinate and integrate federal, state, and local foodborne disease surveillance systems; increase 
participation in national surveillance networks; facilitate timely sharing of information; develop improved 
epidemiologic and laboratory tools; and improve attribution of illnesses to specific foods. Addressing these 
challenges and ensuring the long-term viability of the nation’s foodborne illness surveillance system will require 
strategic planning and new investments in our surveillance infrastructure.  
Based on their review and discussions, the Working Group strongly recommends that, under CDC leadership, a 
comprehensive strategy be developed for designing and implementing a culture-independent typing 
system that meets public health needs while preserving the current capabilities in the interim.  This 
strategy should include the following short- and long-term actions.  Implementation of a comprehensive strategy 
will require adequate resources. 
Short-term Action:  
 Preserve isolates.  Maintaining the capacity to obtain isolates from persons with foodborne illness should be a 
public health priority.  Because of the increasing use of CIDTs, ensuring these cultures will be the 
responsibility of state public health laboratories, which are already under-resourced.  Clinical laboratories 
could be required to culture specimens that are positive by CIDT (reflex-culturing) or to transport specimens 
to public health laboratories for culturing.  In either case, additional resources are required for public health 
laboratories to work with the clinical laboratories to preserve the ability to obtain viable specimens for culture. 
 Adapt surveillance mechanisms to incorporate new laboratory diagnostic methods and technologies.11  
Surveillance case definitions often require a positive culture for a case to be considered confirmed.  These 
definitions will need to be modified so that cases identified by culture-independent methods are included in 
case counts and not lost to national surveillance data.  However, before case definition changes are made, 
these tests will each need to be carefully validated.  Otherwise, national counts could be inflated by false-
positive reports or underestimated from false-negative findings. 
 Enhance surveillance by improving exposure assessment.  The ability to constantly detect and investigate 
cases of foodborne illness has enabled great improvements in food safety and public health. Enhancing the 
quality and quantity of information obtained regarding exposure to contaminated foods by improving exposure 
assessments and reporting tools will have positive impacts and may offset some of the challenges of CIDTs.  
However, obtaining exposure information is labor-intensive.12  Most state and local public health agencies 
lack full workforce capacity and rely heavily on extramural funding provided through CDC’s Epidemiology and 
Laboratory Capacity for Infectious Diseases Cooperative Agreement (ELC) to support their surveillance 
activities.  Increased extramural food safety funding for ELC grants, the development of new exposure 
assessment and reporting tools, and public health training programs are needed. 




Long-term Action: Invest in infrastructure and research. 
 Develop new molecular methods for disease surveillance (PulseNet-NextGen). Next-generation diagnostic 
technologies offer many opportunities for improved tracking of foodborne pathogens, but the science is not 
yet fully developed, and, as mentioned above, bacterial gene sequencing still relies on the availability of a 
culture.  Genomics and metagenomics, in particular, may serve as useful tools for detecting and 
characterizing foodborne pathogens.  However, development of these methods will require a concerted 
research effort and re-tooling of the national and international subtype-based surveillance infrastructure. 
 Modernize foodborne illness surveillance systems by incorporating new molecular methods for pathogen 
identification and characterization.  Shifting to a new system will require strategic planning.  Many of the next-
generation molecular methods require pathogen reference libraries that do not yet exist.  Further, it will be 
necessary to build consensus on shared standards and consistency.  Finally, public health agencies at the 
federal, state, and local levels will need increased bioinformatics capacity to handle the volumes of molecular 
data that will be generated.  Significant investments in strategic planning and infrastructure are critically 
needed.  These capacity development efforts should be coordinated with those of federal food regulatory 
agencies to ensure alignment of various federal activities as we move toward a better integrated food safety 
system. 
Performance Measures to Enhance Federal, State, and Local Foodborne Illness Surveillance.   
The Food Safety Modernization Act directs CDC and its partners to enhance surveillance of foodborne illness.  
Performance measures are tools that can be used to evaluate the timeliness and effectiveness of foodborne 
disease surveillance. To improve U.S. capacity to prevent and control foodborne disease, performance measures 
can allow integration of data at state, regional, or national levels which, in turn, can  
• Promote common understanding of key elements of foodborne disease surveillance; 
• Facilitate training of food program staff; 
• Evaluate program effectiveness and build the public health knowledge base to identify best practices. 
The FSMA SWG was asked to provide CDC guidance on how to best use performance measures to enhance 
foodborne illness surveillance at the federal, state, and local levels.  For the purposes of that discussion, the 
following definitions were used: 
• Performance measure:  a quantifiable description of program accomplishments, particularly 
progress towards pre-established goals 
• Indicator:  a process or step that helps accomplish a specific objective 
• Metric:  a measurement of how well the process or step is being conducted 
• Target:  a threshold or range of values for how well the process or step should be conducted 
As background information, the Working Group was briefed on ways in which CDC has been working with its 
state and local partners and the Council to Improve Outbreak Surveillance and Response (CIFOR) to develop 
improved surveillance measures for foodborne illness outbreak investigations.12  Examples of these performance 
measures include the following: 
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• Foodborne illness outbreak rate:  Rate of outbreaks reported per 1 million population 
(http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety/outbreak_report.html; and 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6203a1.htm?s_cid=mm6203a1_w). 
• Isolate submissions to public health laboratory:  Number and percent of isolates from confirmed cases 
submitted to a public health lab 
• Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) E. coli O157 and Listeria subtyping interval:   Percent of 
PFGE subtyping results for E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria submitted to the PulseNet national database 
within 4 working days of receiving the isolate at the PFGE lab 
• Outbreak etiology, vehicle for transmission, and contributing factor reporting to the National Outbreak 
Reporting System (NORS): 
o Number and percent of outbreaks for which an etiology was identified and reported to NORS 
o Number and percent of outbreaks for which a vehicle for transmission was identified and reported 
to NORS 
o Number and percent of outbreaks for which contributing factors were identified and reported to 
NORS 
CDC has also been using CIFOR-adopted performance measures similar to those described above to help 
enhance surveillance in the food safety programs it helps support (e.g., the Foodborne Disease Active 
Surveillance Network (FoodNet), the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System, PulseNet, NARMS, the 
National Electronic Norovirus Outbreak Network (CaliciNet), the Environmental Health Specialists Network (EHS-
Net), FoodCORE, and the Integrated Food Safety Centers of Excellence).  In addition, CDC’s Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness Program’s performance measures and the Office of State, Territorial, Local and Tribal 
Support’s Prevention Status Report (http://www.cdc.gov/stltpublichealth/psr/) will include foodborne illness metrics 
to measure state’s progress in reaching desired goals.  
With this information as background, the Working Group considered and provided guidance on the following 
questions: 
• What is the value of performance measures for foodborne illness surveillance? 
 
The Working Group believes that standardized performance measures could promote a common 
understanding of key elements of foodborne disease surveillance and response. They could improve 
performance by identifying performance gaps within and between states, examine reasons for those 
gaps, and stimulate effective actions to address them.  Performance measures could help states justify 
ongoing and future investments and inform priority setting. 
• How should performance measures be selected? 
The Working Group suggested that measures be chosen in collaboration with state and local health 
departments, based on the importance of these measures in achieving food safety goals related to 
disease prevention, disease surveillance, and outbreak response.  Performance measures should be 
prioritized based on the burden and severity of specific diseases and data necessary for attributing 
foodborne diseases to particular food sources. For example, gaps in attribution result in part from 
incomplete outbreak investigations and food exposure assessments. Where applicable, performance 
measures should be linked to CIFOR guidelines (http://www.cifor.us/).13 
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• What are the barriers to implementing performance measures? 
The Working Group believes that implementation barriers include disagreement on which measures are 
most important and difficulties in gathering performance data (e.g., technical issues involved in sharing or 
gaining access to data). These obstacles result in a difficult and complicated reporting process that 
functions differently across various state structures for gathering disease surveillance (e.g., centralized 
vs. decentralized).  In general, state and local agencies lack human and financial resources to modify 
data reporting systems to gather and report performance data. These agencies also have concerns for 
political ramifications if measures are misinterpreted or suggest poor performance. To date, there have 
been insufficient incentives and lack of “champions” to move reporting systems forward. 
• What are the key factors to implementing performance measures? 
The Working Group agreed that key factors in developing performance measures include  
a shared vision of their importance;  state and local health department involvement in the development  
and implementation of performance measures; recognition that external evaluations are being conducted 
without health department participation; and the opportunity to ensure mutual accountability among 
federal, state, and local partners;  Meaningful performance measures should be maintained through an 
iterative process with regular review, discussion, and modification.  To be sustainable, the measures 
should be easy to record and report and health departments should be prepared to invest dedicated staff 
time and resources for their implementation.  
• What additional factors could support performance measure implementation in low-resource states? 
The Working Group emphasized that implementation of performance measures in low-resource states 
could be facilitated by providing incentives such as partnering them with high performance states (e.g., 
Integrated Food Safety Centers of Excellence) as used with the Rapid Response team mentoring 
program 
(http://www.fda.gov/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/CooperativeAgreementsCRADAsGrants/ucm29740
7.htm), linking the use of the metrics to accreditation, and exploring the use of incentives that are 
conditional on performance measure improvement.  
The Working Group strongly endorsed the use of meaningful foodborne illness surveillance performance 
measures at the local, state, and federal levels to encourage programmatic accountability, build the public health 
knowledge base to identify best practices, and show progress in reducing foodborne illness.  They noted that the 
use of these metrics at the state and local levels will help national efforts to quantify the impact of foodborne 
surveillance programs, policies, and regulatory changes and to track progress on improvements in the food safety 
system.     
RESOURCES 
The FSMA SWG acknowledged that additional resources are required to build on and better integrate existing 
surveillance systems and fill existing data gaps.  There is also a critical need to build capacity at the state and 
local levels that have experienced severe losses in capacity (reduction of >50,000 personnel from 2008-2012 
according to estimates from the National Association of County and City Health Officials and the Association of 
State and Territorial Health Officials), including hiring experienced foodborne epidemiology, laboratory, and 
environmental personnel.  This includes the need to engage schools of public health to train the existing 
workforce and the next generation of state and local food safety public health scientists and practitioners.   The 
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Working Group continues to be concerned about the lack of attention to adequate funding for programmatic 
efforts uniquely directed by CDC and implemented by state and local health departments.  Specifically, none of 
the surveillance requirements authorized by FSMA have received corresponding additional appropriations to allow 
for adequate implementation. 
NEXT STEPS 
• To provide additional guidance on these and other emerging priority areas, the Working Group will devote 
time at future meetings to explore a major priority area in more depth and provide associated advice for 
future actions. These reviews will include expert presentations on current status and progress of each 
priority followed by a discussion on what enhancements could be made to improve foodborne illness 
surveillance in that area. Two priority areas to be reviewed in more depth during FY 2014 are 
• How to enhance surveillance for norovirus infections, which are the leading cause of foodborne 
illness in the United States 
• How to improve surveillance, analysis, and utilization of antimicrobial resistance data for foodborne 
disease pathogens 
In conclusion, the Working Group believes that important progress has been made in the implementation 
of FSMA but that significant gaps remain that impact the quality of foodborne illness surveillance data.  
Ensuring states have the staff and resources to fully investigate outbreaks by identifying both the food 
and pathogen responsible and reporting of these data to the NORS along with improvements in the 
integration and sharing of data are prerequisites to the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of 
science-based disease prevention and control policies and to an improved overall integrated food safety 
system.   
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Appendix 1: Surveillance Working Group 
Working Group Members 
Meetings in December 2012 and May 2013 
BSC Representative Members:   
• Chair:  James Hadler, MD, MPH – Associate Professor, Yale University 
• Harry Chen, MD – Commissioner, Vermont Department of Health 
Federal Partner Members: 
• Dale Morse, MD, MS – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
• Jeffrey Farrar, DVM, MPH, PhD – Food and Drug Administration 
• David Goldman, MD, MPH – United States Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection 
Service 
Public Health Partner Agency Members: 
• Robyn Atkinson, PhD, HCLD – Association of Public Health Laboratories 
• Thomas S. Dunlop, MPH, REHS – National Environmental Health Association 
• Timothy Jones, MD – Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists 
• Heidi Kassenborg, DVM, MPH – Association of Food and Drug Officials 
• Mary Currier Mallette, MD, MPH – Association of State and Territorial Health Officials 
• Joseph Russell, MPH, RS – National Association of County and City Health Officials 
• John Tilden, Jr., MS, DVM, MPH – National Association of State Departments of Agriculture 
Consumer Partner Members: 
• Caroline Smith DeWaal, JD – Center for Science in the Public Interest 
• Sandra Eskin, JD – The Pew Charitable Trust 
• Barbara Kowalcyk, PhD – Center for Foodborne Illness Research and Prevention  
Industry Partner Members: 
• Catherine Adams Hutt, PhD, RD – National Restaurant Association   
• Russell S. Flowers, Jr., PhD – Mérieux NutriSciences Corporation  
• Joan Menke-Schaenzer – ConAgra Foods, Inc  
Academia Partner Members: 
• Craig Hedberg, MS, PhD – Professor, University of Minnesota 
• Leeann Jaykus, PhD – Professor, North Carolina State University 
• John Glenn Morris, Jr., MD, MPH&TM – Professor, University of Florida  
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Appendix 2: Selected CDC Accomplishments in Implementing FSMA Surveillance Requirements 
The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) recognizes that robust foodborne illness surveillance data are 
needed to inform prevention efforts. FSMA directly links surveillance with prevention and highlights the need for 
stronger partnerships. Relying on CDC's expertise in this area, FSMA directs the agency to improve governmental 
coordination and integration, evaluate and improve foodborne illness surveillance systems, and enhance external 
stakeholder collaboration. All are critical components of surveillance. 
CDC is supporting the implementation of FSMA through many activities.  Despite reduced resources at the local, 
state, and federal levels and no appropriation to support CDC FSMA activities, in FY 2013 CDC met ongoing 
requirements and supported existing infrastructure for laboratory, surveillance, and response activities and 
allocated $1M to continue activities of the five Integrated Food Safety Centers of Excellence.  Below is a summary 
of selected CDC accomplishments in support of FSMA.  Most of these activities build upon existing infrastructure 
and labor capacity, but some are new and exclusively address CDC surveillance responsibilities under FSMA.    
I. Improving Governmental Coordination and Integration 
Food safety is a shared enterprise among local, state, and federal public health partners. FSMA recognizes that 
strong coordination among partners is essential to rapidly detect food safety problems, determine where those 
problems are occurring, and identify and use effective strategies to prevent foodborne illness. To that end, CDC is 
working to strengthen coordination and data sharing across government agencies and with external partners.  
Selected examples of these efforts are described below. 
Coordinate federal, state, and local foodborne illness surveillance systems. 
• Multistate foodborne illness outbreak investigations 
CDC supported federal, state, and local health agencies through monitoring 15-40 clusters of potential 
foodborne illness per week, resulting in approximately 10 major multistate outbreak investigations in FY 2013 
(Appendix 3).  Additionally, CDC is enhancing foodborne illness and outbreak metrics in the Epidemiology 
and Laboratory Capacity for Infectious Diseases Cooperative Agreement (ELC) sites and is working with the 
Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR) to develop performance measures and 
associated targets for their guidelines for states to use in their outbreak investigations.  The council serves 
many professional organizations focused on state and local health department activities.  
• CDC support of FDA Implementation of FSMA 
CDC is working closely with FDA to support its FSMA implementation efforts by providing expert guidance to 
a number of FDA work groups, including those focusing on produce, food defense, and state and local 
capacity.   For example, 
— CDC representatives participated in the National Agriculture and Food Defense Strategy Interagency 
Workgroup, which has drafted a National Agriculture and Food Defense Strategy that includes an 
implementation plan and a coordinated research agenda. (FSMA Section 108). 
o FSMA Section 108, directs the development of a National Agriculture and Food Defense 
Strategy under which FDA, USDA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CDC, and state, local and tribal health authorities 
can work together to protect the food supply from hazards that might be intentionally added to 
food in the United States. 
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— CDC representatives have served on the Advisory Committee to the FDA Rapid Response Team 
(RRT)Network.  The RRT network, currently comprising 18 states, in collaboration with FDA, has 
been developed over the past 3 years, in response to several FSMA directives aimed at FDA (FSMA 
Sections 202, 205c, and 209). 
— CDC has contributed to the FDA-led report on the Food Emergency Response Network (FSMA 202 
[b]). 
o Sections 202: FDA is directed to, in coordination with other agencies, report on progress in 
implementing a national Food Emergency Response Network that coordinates the capacity of 
state and local laboratories to be integrated with federal laboratories to respond to food-
related emergencies.    
o Section 205 (C ): Directs FDA to leverage and enhance food safety and defense capacities of 
the states to improve outbreak response and investigation, build state inspection capacity 
and coordination with FDA, and better share information among federal and state agencies. 
o Section 209: Directs FDA to administer programs to improve the training of state and local 
food safety officials. 
— CDC representatives participated in the FSMA 110(g) Food Safety Research Report Interagency 
WorkGroup, which is drafting the development of a joint food safety and food defense research plan 
and report (FSMA 110[g]). 
o FSMA Section 110g directs the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to submit to Congress, on a biennial basis, a joint food safety 
and food defense research plan which may include studying the long-term health effects of 
foodborne illness. 
— CDC has partnered with FDA and USDA/FSIS on each biennial issue of the Food Code, a model 
ordinance developed through the Conference for Food Protection. 
— CDC enteric disease surveillance and food safety experts participated in several FSMA working 
groups, serving as subject matter experts and advisors on proposed regulations (e.g., the Produce 
Rule), cost analyses, and analyses related to establishing FSMA performance standards (Section 
104) and food tracing (Section 204). 
Toxoplasma gondii serosurveillance:  At CDC, collaboration between the Division of Parasitic Diseases 
and Malaria in the Center for Global Health and the Division of Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys in 
the National Center for Health Statistics resulted in testing of 7,072 surplus serum samples from the National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) for 2009-2010. Trichinellosis surveillance:  In 
collaboration with state colleagues and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), the 
sensitivity and specificity of national trichinellosis surveillance was enhanced by creating probable and 
suspected case definitions. Previously, asymptomatic persons were counted as “confirmed” in an outbreak 
setting based on a positive laboratory result, which may not have reflected recent exposure. Also, persons 
with signs and symptoms compatible with trichinellosis who ate a food product found to contain Trichinella 
parasites but for whom no biologic specimens were available for testing could not be classified as cases. 
Interagency Collaboration to Pilot the Application of Whole Genome Sequencing for Enhanced, 
Integrated Surveillance of the Foodborne Pathogen Listeria monocytogenes in the U.S.: 
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Detecting contamination of foods, quickly and accurately identifying the causative foodborne pathogen, and 
controlling foodborne illness outbreaks are national priorities.  Listeria monocytogenes is estimated to cause 
nearly 1,600 illnesses each year in the United States, with more than 1,400 related hospitalizations and 250 
related deaths.  Beginning in 2013, FDA, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and CDC partnered to pilot 
an integrated surveillance system for L. monocytogenes based on the application of whole genome 
sequencing to identify specific strains of Listeria in contaminated food and environmental isolates (FDA) and 
in isolates from persons with foodborne illness (CDC).  Knowing the exact order of molecules in a foodborne 
pathogen’s genome allows scientists to more quickly and accurately identify specific strains of bacteria in 
foods, find cases linked to foodborne disease outbreaks under investigation, identify where the original 
contamination of food(s) likely occurred, and quickly identify which food products need to be recalled.  This 
groundbreaking collaboration has built upon several projects, including 
1) the FDA supported Genome-Trakr initiative, launched in 2008, in which whole genome sequencing is 
used to identify specific strains of Listeria spp. in isolates obtained from contaminated food and food-
processing environments by FDA and collaborating states 
(http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/) 
2) the CDC supported Listeria Project, launched in 2005, in which contributing states and PulseNet 
laboratories submit Listeria isolates from persons with foodborne illness to CDC for both PFGE testing 
(http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/pdf/ListeriaInitiativeOverview_508.pdf) and, with this pilot, whole genome 
sequencing, and  
3) bioinformatics expertise and big data storage and analysis infrastructure provided by NIH 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/guide/).  The genome sequences from food, environmental, and clinical 
isolates are being archived in a NIH/National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI)--supported 
genomic reference database.  During the pilot, contaminated food, environmental, and clinical isolates 
are sequenced and uploaded into the NCBI data base, along with basic demographic, clinical, and 
laboratory metadata.  The sequences and accompanying metadata are accessible to public health 
officials at all three agencies.  Sequences and corresponding metadata from food and environmental 
isolates uploaded by FDA are being made publicly accessible in real time.  For the clinical isolates, CDC 
is working with contributing states and PulseNet laboratories to determine at what stage, in relation to 
current ongoing outbreaks, the accompanying metadata can be made publicly accessible in a way that 
will advance the timeliness and effectiveness of outbreak detection, investigation, and control, while 
protecting patient confidentiality and ensuring compliance with CDC and state data sharing agreements.    
FoodNet Surveillance: Continued collaboration among CDC, FDA, USDA/FSIS, and 10 state health 
departments participating in FoodNet resulted in major publications on the 
• Incidence of Salmonella and Salmonella serotype Enteritidis to monitor progress toward High Priority 
Health Objectives. 
• Incidence and trends of infection with pathogens transmitted commonly through food.3,14  
Hepatitis A surveillance:  Continued to work with CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine 
(DGMQ) and the Mexican national government to implement the Border Infectious Disease Surveillance 
System (BIDS), a surveillance system for monitoring diseases such as viral hepatitis along both sides of the 
U.S.-Mexico Border.  
• Initiated a new cooperative agreement with 7 sites–Massachusetts, Philadelphia, San Francisco, New 




Increase participation of public health and food regulatory agencies and laboratories in national networks  
Local and state health departments are the foundation of food safety efforts because they investigate outbreaks, 
conduct disease surveillance, and implement local control measures. FSMA recognizes the critical role of local, 
territorial, tribal, and state agencies in a national food safety system with provisions to coordinate, integrate, and 
enhance surveillance and outbreak response activities at all levels.  Therefore, CDC is using existing resources to 
enhance and integrate these critical national surveillance, outbreak detection, and response networks by 
providing funding, tools and training, and strategic leadership.  These enhancements are expected to improve the 
quality of data obtained.  Strong data are needed to quickly identify the source of outbreaks and inform prevention 
efforts, and these enhancements will help ensure that data are analyzed and shared quickly to help in rapid 
response to food safety gaps.  Specifically, CDC provided approximately $15 million in FY 2013 funding to local 
and state public health departments through the ELC and the Emerging Infections Programs (EIP) to support 
critical foodborne illness surveillance efforts.  This funding was essential to maintain core infectious disease 
capacity to track, detect, investigate, and respond to emerging foodborne disease threats. Other activities to 
support national networks included: 
Supporting enteric disease labs: 
• Coordinated the national proficiency testing program for the identification and subtyping of 
Salmonella, Escherichia coli, Shigella, and Campylobacter; 64 laboratories participated in the 2013 
cycle. 
• Offered a Salmonella workshop to train state partners on isolation, identification, and serotyping of 
Salmonella and expanded the number of states trained to use a new Salmonella serotyping assay to 
40.  
• Trained more than 30 partners from state and local public health laboratories, USDA, and FDA, and 
more than 10 partners from foreign countries in PulseNet methods during the past year. 
• Contributed to a joint CDC/FDA/USDA/State public health laboratory project to publicly release whole 
genome sequence-based surveillance data for L. monocytogenes via NCBI/Genbank. 
Preparations for the launch of CryptoNet to selected FoodNet/FoodCORE/OutbreakNet states:  To 
improve the surveillance and outbreak investigation of cryptosporidiosis, CDC’s Waterborne Disease 
Prevention Branch developed CryptoNet, a molecular subtyping system (similar to PulseNet) that targets 
Cryptosporidium infections. This system was tested internally during the 2009-2013 outbreak seasons and 
was shown to be very useful in identifying outbreaks, tracking infections and contamination sources, and 
investigating sporadic cases.  In FY 2013, several collaborative state public health laboratories, including New 
York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan, Minnesota, Maine, North Carolina, Colorado, Tennessee, 
Wisconsin, Oregon, and  Idaho, submitted outbreak and/or sporadic case samples for molecular analysis and 
inclusion in Cryptonet. 
Establishment of the Norovirus Sentinel Testing and Tracking (NoroSTAT) Network:  Beginning in 
August 2012, a network of five sentinel states was established to improve the timeliness of norovirus outbreak 
reporting through NORS and CaliciNet, allowing near real-time assessment of norovirus activity. These five 
states (Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Wisconsin) include ≈33 million residents or 11% of the total 
U.S. population spread across several regions of the country.  In addition, these states historically had the 
highest per capita reporting rates for norovirus outbreaks and therefore were least likely to be affected by 
underreporting biases. State health departments that participate in NoroSTAT report suspected norovirus 
outbreaks through NORS and CaliciNet within 7 business days of notification of the outbreak to the state 
health department. NoroSTAT reporting allows norovirus strain data uploaded through CaliciNet to be rapidly 
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linked with epidemiologic characteristics of outbreaks reported through NORS by using consistent outbreak 
identifiers in each system. 
CalicNet enhancements:  In FY 2013, CaliciNet (the national norovirus outbreak reporting network) 
increased the number of participating certified states from 25 to 28.  Specimens from norovirus outbreaks 
from the remaining 22 states were typed by 5 regional CaliciNet support centers.  Norovirus typing information 
was submitted for 1,333 norovirus outbreaks, 14.1% of which had been epidemiologically identified as 
foodborne. 
Share surveillance information on a timelier basis among federal, state, and local agencies. 
The National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS): 
• Launched the NARMS web-based communication tool in October 2012 with the 54 state and local 
participating public health departments.  By August 2013, 94% of participants had successfully 
uploaded information on the bacterial isolates tested by NARMS.  Progress was made on 
development of functions that will enable communication of test result data back to the submitter 
using the same secure web-based tool. 
• Produced interactive graphs of NARMS human isolate antimicrobial resistance data for all bacteria 
tested using dashboard software. These web-ready graphs have been posted on the NARMS public-
facing webpage (http://www.cdc.gov/narms/interactive-data-displays.html). 
• Tested over 550 bacteria from outbreaks or for enhanced surveillance for emerging resistance, 
including representatives of Campylobacter, Escherichia coli, Salmonella, and Shigella.   Findings for 
outbreaks were reported back to submitting sites and key CDC stakeholders as soon as results were 
approved.  NARMS developed a standard operating procedure that outlines the process for 
requesting state health department submission of isolates from outbreaks for antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing. 
The Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System (FDOSS): 
• Conducted four foodborne disease outbreak webinars to enhance sharing of surveillance data with 
and to provide training to state and local health departments on foodborne disease outbreak 
reporting.  Nearly all states participated.  
• Decreased the time to provide online access to outbreak line listing from >5 years to <2 years.  
• Updated the online Food Tool  (http://www.cdc.gov/outbreaknet/FOOD-faq.html) to improve public 
access to past foodborne outbreak data  
Identify and propose solutions to eliminate key barriers at federal, state, and local levels to improve 
foodborne illness surveillance.  
Environmental Health Specialist Network (EHS-Net) Enhancements:  The National Voluntary 
Environmental Assessment Information System (NVEAIS) received OMB clearance on August 23, 2013, and 
is scheduled to be available to food safety programs in the near future.  This new system will allow for local 
and state health departments to report contributing factors and environmental antecedents from foodborne 
outbreak environmental assessments associated with retail food service to CDC.  The system is being made 
available at the same time as the e-learning training on How to Conduct a Foodborne Illness Outbreak 
Environmental Assessment. The e-Learning training is internet based and free to users world-wide. It is 
designed to improve domestic foodborne outbreak environmental assessments and the quality of the data 
reported to NVEAIS and other surveillance systems. 
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II. Evaluating and Improving Surveillance Systems 
Develop improved epidemiological tools and microbiological methods for obtaining quality exposure data 
and identifying/classifying cases. 
Improved data collection via FoodNet  
• Developed a plan for implementation of foodborne disease exposure questions for Salmonella 
serotype Enteritidis cases  
• Continued development of a set of attribution questions on exposures of interest to be added to 
routine surveillance  
Improved multistate foodborne outbreak tracking system:  CDC partnered with Palantir Technologies to 
develop Palantir SEDRIC (the System for Enteric Disease Response, Investigation, and Coordination), a web-
based platform that can be used to facilitate collaborative multistate foodborne outbreak investigations. During 
the year, SEDRIC has been made available to 314 users in 48 states, CDC, FDA, and USDA/FSIS. 
Identification of new food vehicles causing foodborne illness:  CDC and its partners also identified new 
food vehicles during foodborne outbreak investigations.  Information on risks from these foods, which have 
never before been tied to outbreaks or illnesses, provide a feedback loop to industry and regulators to allow 
development of better safety standards.  For example, since 2006, CDC has identified at least 15 new foods 
that have become contaminated and made people sick—including Turkish tahini sesame paste that made 16 
people from nine states sick with Salmonella Montevideo and Salmonella Mbandaka infection in 2012 
(Appendix 3). 
Development of better methods to detect, investigate, respond to, and control multistate foodborne 
outbreaks:  CDC has also continued support of the FoodCORE program, a group of seven centers that are 
enhancing foodborne disease outbreak response.  Using targeted resources, the centers develop innovative 
and better methods to detect, investigate, respond to, and control multistate outbreaks of foodborne diseases.  
Leveraging laboratory, epidemiology, and environmental health capacity, FoodCORE centers successfully 
developed and applied model practices to build capacity for routine and surge capacity needs, making faster, 
more complete investigations possible.  FoodCORE centers improved timeliness and completeness of their 
foodborne disease outbreak response programs and used performance metrics to document progress. The 
first annual summary for FoodCORE activities was completed; the report is available on the FoodCORE 
website (http://www.cdc.gov/foodcore/), along with program highlights and additional information for 
FoodCORE performance metrics and model practices. 
Examples of activities undertaken by CDC’s Enteric Diseases Laboratory Branch to enhance lab 
methods: 
• Began the effort to assess the use of whole genome sequencing as part of the PulseNet 
armamentarium for characterization of outbreak-related foodborne pathogens and began exploring 
the utility of the method for molecular serotyping and characterization of associated virulence, 
antimicrobial resistance, and house-keeping genes of foodborne pathogens. 
• Deployed Salmonella molecular serotyping assay to state health departments and facilitated making 
the assay available at reduced pricing through a commercial partner. 
• Completed the validation of mass spectroscopy (Endo-PEP MS) for the detection of botulinum 
neurotoxin in clinical and non-clinical specimens and began plans to implement the method routinely 
in the surveillance of botulism in the United States. This project will remove the need for using the 
reference method for botulinum neurotoxin testing (the mouse bioassay) outside CDC.  
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• Initiated a 1-year proof-of-concept study of the use of whole genome sequencing for enhanced 
surveillance of listeriosis in collaboration with CDC, FDA, USDA, NIH, and public health and 
agricultural partners locally, nationally, and internationally. 
Examples of efforts undertaken by CDC’s parasitic diseases laboratory to improve cyclosporiasis and 
trichinella diagnoses: 
• Designed, optimized, and utilized a TaqMan assay designed for identification of Cyclospora 
cayetanensis (identification to the species level), as a confirmatory diagnostic technique on 75 
specimens during the recent multistate cyclosporiasis outbreak investigation.  
• Developed a new DNA extraction method to improve molecular diagnosis of cyclosporiasis. 
• Identified and evaluated a new EIA kit for serologic diagnosis of Trichinella infection. Laboratory staff 
optimized the test and improved its specificity, resulting in a new assay that is more reliable and 
consistent than the previous assay, directly affecting the completeness and accuracy of surveillance 
and outbreak data. 
Tracking and analysis of culture-independent test use in laboratories:  FoodNet continued to actively 
track and analyze the use of culture-independent tests in the laboratories serving the surveillance area.  
Abstracts presented during IDWeek 2012 included “Diagnostic practices for detection of enteric infections in 
clinical laboratories – FoodNet, 2012”15  and “Changes in diagnostic methods used by clinical laboratories to 
detect Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) infections – FoodNet, 2007-2012.”16 
Improved attribution of foodborne illness outbreaks to specific foods. 
Since its creation in 2011 the CDC/FDA/FSIS Interagency Food Safety Analytics Collaboration (IFSAC) has 
focused analytic efforts on developing methods to estimate foodborne illness source attribution for priority 
pathogens. In 2013, IFSAC project teams, composed of members of each agency and coordinated by a steering 
committee, completed the following: 
• Provided estimates of the proportion of Salmonella serotype Enteritidis (SE) illnesses attributable to shell 
eggs and other major commodities as part of a Health and Human Services Priority Goal to reduce SE 
illnesses transmitted by shell eggs (http://goals.performance.gov/goal_detail/HHS/372). 
• Worked to develop a shared method to estimate the proportion of foodborne illnesses caused by 
Salmonella, Campylobacter, Escherichia coli O157:H7, and Listeria attributable to 24 different food 
categories.  
• Provided consultations to member agencies and participated in a series of information exchanges with 
the Interagency Risk Assessment Consortium; these consultations have established precedents for 
improved communication and collaboration on top food safety priorities.  
• Agreed on a shared communication plan to inform the public and stakeholders about IFSAC activities and 
projects. As part of communication efforts, IFSAC held a webinar in June 2013 to update nearly 200 
participants from food industry, consumer advocacy groups, academia, and public health on recent 
changes to food categories used for foodborne illness source attribution (Webinar), held a symposium at 
the annual meeting of the International Association of Food Protection (IAFP), and is developing related 
webpages scheduled to go live in early FY 2014.   
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Other CDC-supported activities to enhance attribution include the following: 
• USDA/FSIS and the University of Florida utilized NHANES Toxoplasma gondii data to help determine the 
annual cost and quality-adjusted life-year losses attributed to foodborne toxoplasmosis in the United 
States.  In this evaluation, Toxoplasma gondii was a leading source of costs and loss of quality-adjusted 
life years.17  
• The Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System developed 1) a new food commodity scheme for 
classifying foods implicated in outbreaks and 2) new methodology to examine outbreak details to more 
accurately attribute outbreaks to foods.   
III. Enhanced External Stakeholder Collaboration and Sharing of Information 
Share surveillance information on a timelier basis with the food industry, academia, consumers, and 
the public 
Media and public interest has 
been higher for foodborne illness 
and outbreaks than for almost 
any other CDC program.  
In 2012, CDC received more 
than 1,600 media requests for 
information on food safety issues 
–ranging from complex data 
releases to outbreak updates. 
Stakeholders—from farmers to regulators to consumers—rely on CDC 
for information to help keep the food supply safe, including practical 
information the public can use.  
CDC manages strategic partnerships by promoting, exchanging, and 
disseminating information through oral and written briefings, websites, 
blogs and social media, partner updates, and media interviews.   
Since the inception of FSMA, CDC has worked diligently to improve 
sharing of timely information through integrating communication, 
science, and policy expertise. This team approach better meets today’s 
need for fast and accurate information, often in the form of social media, and reaches a broader audience base. 
Partners prefer that CDC share relevant information on new and complex data directly, in lieu of, or in addition to, 
scientific publications. 
Historically, food safety communications included annual surveillance summaries with data from the surveillance 
networks, scientific publications and presentations, and outbreak alerts. Today, the public demands more 
information—more frequently and through multiple platforms. 
Science & Communications–Targeting Food Safety 
One way that CDC blends science and communications is through its Vital Signs program 
(http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/), a campaign using the latest available surveillance data to produce a call-to-action 
about an important public health topic.  CDC’s first Vital Signs devoted to food safety 
(http://www.cdc.gov/VitalSigns/Foodsafety/index.html) focused on one of the most common germs found in 
food—Salmonella. This year’s Vital Signs food safety report (http://www.cdc.gov/VitalSigns/Listeria/index.html) 
examined one of the most deadly germs spread by contaminated food-Listeria monocytogenes (Listeria), and 
described high-risk populations and actions that can be taken to protect those who are most at risk. It also 
highlighted the importance of safety measures to prevent contamination of cheese and raw produce, such as 
those included in the 2011 FSMA.  The 2013 report also provided a national snapshot of illnesses, infection rates, 
and foods associated with Listeria outbreaks reported to the CDC during 2009-2011. Three monitoring systems 
were used to collect data: the Listeria Initiative, a national system for rapid response and reporting of Listeria 
cases; FoodNet, an active surveillance network for tracking trends in nine foodborne infections; and Foodborne 




• In one month, there were 746 news articles on the Vital Signs information in the form of 483 online 
broadcasts, 67 news web sites, 122 television station shows, 24 online print version stories, 16 daily 
newspapers, and 16 blogs and other media. For comparison, the two previous Vital Signs releases 
garnered 318 and 444 news articles respectively.  
• Potential reach of more than 420 million people.  
o Defined as the number of people who could have potentially seen one of these articles, by virtue 
of average copies sold per day (circulation), or broadcast or cable TV (Nielsen), or online 
(counting unique site visitors per month).   
Twitter was 
the #1 way 
Vital Signs 
was shared  
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Selected 2013 Partnership Highlights: 
In 2013, CDC made it a priority to consistently engage partners prior to major data releases, to update and 
develop new websites with interactive tools and graphics, to engage the media, and to send regular partner 
notifications.  
2013 highlights included: 
• Provided over 10 briefings to 300 partners for key data releases  
• Doubled web page views on CDC’s websites for food safety 
• Created new or updated major websites for Integrated Food Safety Centers of Excellence, 
(http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/centers/index.html), PulseNet (http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/), NARMS 
(http://www.cdc.gov/narms/), Foodborne Outbreak Tracking and Reporting 
(http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/fdoss/index.html), and others  
• Hosted 30 executives and communicators from 17 major food companies for a day-long meeting  
• Co-authored CDC’s Antibiotic Resistance Threats Report (http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-
report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf), with world-wide distribution. Geared to policy and public 
audiences, the report, for the first time, consolidated CDC data to show the alarming and major problem 
of antimicrobial resistance for the United States 
• Sent monthly updates to food safety partners through CDC’s GovDelivery distribution channel 
reaching 30,000 subscribers--a 7,000 jump in monthly subscribers since January.  
(http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/announcements.html.) 
EPi Ready Team Training:  CDC’s Food Safety Office/Division of Foodborne, Waterborne, and 
Environmental Diseases funded the National Environmental Health Association to conduct three Epi-Ready 
Team Training courses during the spring and summer of 2013 in Racine, Wisconsin; Plainview (Lubbock), 
Texas; and Contra Costa County, California.  More than 140 local and state officials participated in the 2-day 
classroom courses which covered topics such as outbreak team formation, planning, detection, and 
investigation by teams of epidemiologists, laboratorians, environmental health specialists, public health 
nurses, communication experts, and others. 
Food Allergy and Anaphylaxis Management:  FSMA §112(b)(1) required the Establishment of Voluntary 
Food Allergy and Anaphylaxis Management Guidelines for use in schools and early childhood education 
programs.  To help address this requirement, CDC convened an expert panel to inform guidance priorities 
and content, and summarized scientific and school health-related data and papers related to managing food 
allergies in schools. Subsequently, an advisory working group of federal agencies and relevant organizations 
was formed to inform school food allergy guidance. Federal agency partners included the Department of 
Education, USDA, and several other HHS agencies (FDA, NIH/National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute). 
 Experts in the fields of food allergy included the Food Allergy and Anaphylaxis Network; the Food Allergy 
Institute; American Academy of Allergy, Asthma, and Immunology; and the American College of Asthma, 
Allergy, and Immunology. Educational and school-health agency representatives included those from the 
National School Boards Association, National Education Association, National Association of School 
Administrators, National Association of School Nurses, and the American School Health Association.  
Proposed guidelines were drafted and cleared by the HHS Secretary, and the new guidelines 
(http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/foodallergies/pdf/13_243135_A_Food_Allergy_Web_508.pdf) were 
released on October 30, 2013.  The National Association of School Nurses, The American Academy of 
Pediatrics, and Food Allergy Research and Education are supporting the release with communication 
materials and trainings.  
Integrated Food Safety Centers of Excellence:  The five Integrated Food Safety Centers of Excellence 
(CoEs) (Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee), which are housed in state health departments 
and partnered with universities, had a productive year.  Accomplishments include training needs assessments 
completed by Florida (covered Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Puerto Rico) and Colorado (state, city, and 
county staff in Colorado).  The findings of these needs assessments will be used to develop various types of 
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training material related to foodborne disease outbreak detection, investigation, and control for local and state 
officials. Colorado developed a catalog of current outbreak training courses across the United States to 
ensure that no duplication will occur in the development of the CoE training material. Florida conducted 
assessments of outbreak plans and procedures in every county in the state. The results will help guide 
development of the training course content. The Minnesota CoE led the development of the initial set of 
performance indicators and metrics for the CoEs and is developing a set of model practices based on years of 
experience in successfully detecting and investigating foodborne disease outbreaks. The Tennessee CoE led 
the development of the CoE design element (logo) and recommended content for CoE websites.  Additionally, 
Tennessee is developing a web-based training course on outbreak detection and response that will be 
publicly available.  The Oregon CoE has conducted on-site assistance to the Alaska Department of Health 
regarding outbreak detection and investigation techniques and processes.  Additionally, Oregon has 
developed several software applications that have the potential to substantially improve tracking foodborne 
illness and investigating outbreaks.  CDC conducted site visits to two CoEs, and an annual CoE Vision 
meeting was held in Atlanta to examine progress and establish future priorities and discuss possible projects.
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Appendix 3: Selected Multistate Foodborne Illness Outbreaks, United States, FY 2013  
Pathogen Distribution Vehicle  
Salmonella Typhimurium and 
Newport 
261 illnesses reported from 24 
states Cantaloupe 
Salmonella Braenderup 127 illnesses reported from 15 states Mangoes 
Salmonella Bredeney 42 illnesses reported from 20 states Peanut butter 
Salmonella Typhimurium 22 illnesses reported from 6 states Ground beef 
Salmonella Heidelberg 134 illnesses reported from 13 states Chicken 
Salmonella Saintpaul 84 illnesses reported from 18 states Cucumbers 
Salmonella Montevideo and 
Mbandaka 16 illnesses reported from 9 states Tahini sesame paste 
Multidrug-resistant Salmonella 
Heidelberg   
362 illnesses reported from 21 
states and Puerto Rico* Chicken 
Cyclosporiasis 631 illnesses reported from 25 states Salad mix, cilantro 
Hepatitis A 162 illnesses reported from 10 states Pomegranate seeds 
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